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371 
Avoiding Flights of Fancy: Determining Venue for Crimes 
Committed During Commercial Flights 
Introduction 
For many years, commercial air flight existed as a luxury available only 
to an elite class of travelers.
1
 Commercial travel has since evolved into a 
modern convenience, with nearly three million passengers flying in or out 
of airports in the United States every day.
2
 In recent years, major airline 
carriers have reduced the number of commercial flights while 
simultaneously increasing the number of available passenger seats.
3
 This 
changing travel landscape means that more passengers are flying together 
on larger, jam-packed flights. Unsurprisingly, these conditions can easily 
create the perfect environment for “air rage” incidents between passengers.
4
 
One such incident occurred in 2015 between passengers seated in the 
back two rows of a plane heading from Minneapolis to Los Angeles.
5
 
Monique Lozoya, who claimed she was just trying to get some sleep on the 
flight, confronted the passenger sitting directly behind her after he 
repeatedly jostled her seat.
6
 After a tense confrontation, Lozoya struck the 
other passenger in the face.
7
 Flight attendants intervened and kept the peace 
between the passengers until the plane landed at Los Angeles International 
Airport (“LAX”).
8
 The parties had agreed to meet there to discuss the 
incident, but Lozoya instead left the airport without meeting with or 
apologizing to the passenger she had struck.
9
 Three weeks later, an FBI 
agent who had investigated the incident issued a violation notice to Lozoya, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Sam McManis, When Luxury Ruled the Skies: Flying in the 1950s and ‘60s, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:20 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/sns-mct-bc-cns-
airlines-sixties-20140915-story.html.  
 2. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC BY THE NUMBERS 6 (2019), 
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers/media/Air_Traffic_by_the_Numbers_2019.
pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Kate Silver, Air Rage Incidents Are on the Rise. First-Class Sections Aren’t 
Helping, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/air-
rage-incidents-are-on-the-rise-first-class-sections-arent-helping/2017/01/23/4e3e6752-dd99-
11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html. 
 5. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 944 
F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2020). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 1233–34.  
 8. See id. at 1234. 
 9. Id. 
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charging her with misdemeanor assault in the Central District of 
California.
10
 The Ninth Circuit ultimately overturned Lozoya’s conviction, 
citing improper venue because the government charged Lozoya in the 




Typically, venue in federal criminal cases is proper in only one district—
the district in which the accused committed the crime.
12
 When the criminal 
behavior takes place across multiple districts or involves interstate 
commerce, however, venue is proper in any district in which the behavior 
was “begun, continued, or completed.”
13
 Criminal behavior on airplanes 
presents a novel question related to venue: can the government prosecute 
the accused in the district where the plane lands, or is the government 
required to determine the plane’s location at the time of the assault and 
bring charges in the district lying thousands of feet below that point? 




Importantly, the rule that ultimately prevails will implicate venue rules 
for all other non-continuous “sky crimes.”
15
 The prevailing rule will also 
inform prosecutions for sexual assault on airplanes,
16
 conduct which 
increased by over sixty-five percent from 2014 to 2017.
17
 It will also apply 
to crimes committed against children,
18
 hundreds of thousands of whom fly 
unaccompanied every year.
19
 And it will apply to assaults between unruly 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1243. 
 12. United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 5 (1998). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018). 
 14. A few days before this Comment was published, the en banc Ninth Circuit issued its 
opinion without oral argument. See United States v. Lozoya, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 
7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). The en banc court held that venue for the assault was 
proper in the Central District of California where the plane landed. See id. at *8. Though this 
Comment focuses on the Ninth Circuit's original opinion, the crux of the court's en banc 
opinion—that 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) applies to crimes committed on commercial aircrafts—is 
largely consistent with the arguments set forth in this Comment. See id. at *4–5. 
 15. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See This Week: Reports of Sexual Assaults Aboard Aircraft on the Rise, FED. 
BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/ftw-podcast-
sexual-assault-aboard-aircraft-042618.mp3/view. 
 18. See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 19. Michelle Higgins, When Children Fly Alone, Who’s in Charge?, N.Y. TIMES (May 
13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/travel/13prac.html. 
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passengers, where alcohol is often a compounding factor.
20
 Therefore, it is 
imperative that courts choose a workable rule that preserves the integrity of 
the justice system while protecting an accused person’s constitutional right 
to trial in the district where the crime occurred. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the constitutional requirements and 
underlying policies of venue. Part II illustrates how each of the three 
branches of government plays a pivotal role in serving these underlying 
policies. Part III explores the added complexity introduced when courts try 
to apply the traditional venue framework to criminal activity committed on 
commercial flights. This section compares the Ninth Circuit’s more rigid 
interpretation of venue requirements in Lozoya with the less literal approach 
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Part IV articulates the shortcomings of 
both of these inflexible approaches to determining proper venue for sky 
crimes. Part V advocates for a functional, flexible approach that will both 
avoid absurd results and respect underlying venue policies better than either 
existing approach.  
I. Constitutional Requirements and Venue Policies 
The significance of venue in criminal proceedings pre-dates the founding 
of our nation.
21
 Early American colonists feared that the British Parliament 
would attempt to prosecute them for criminal behavior, including treason, 
in the English courts.
22
 The Declaration of Independence articulated their 
fears, enumerating King George’s attempts at “transporting [colonists] 




The Framers valued the concept of venue so highly that they included it 
in the Constitution twice.
24
 Article III of the Constitution guarantees venue 
protection on a state level.
25
 It provides that “the Trial of all Crimes, except 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, ANNUAL REVIEW 32 (2017), https://www.iata.org/ 
contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2017.pdf. 
 21. See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998).  
 22. Paul Mogin, “Fundamental Since Our Country's Founding”: United States v. 
Auernheimer and the Sixth Amendment Right to Be Tried in the District in Which the 
Alleged Crime Was Committed, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2016). 
 23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); see The Declaration of 
Independence: The Twenty-Seven Grievances, J. AM. REVOLUTION (July 4, 2019), 
https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/07/the-declaration-of-independence-the-twenty-seven-
grievances/. 
 24. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Proper venue is a 
safeguard that is guaranteed twice in the Constitution.”). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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in Cases of Impeachment . . . shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed.”
26
 The Sixth Amendment further 
protects a person accused of a crime, guaranteeing proper venue at a district 
level.
27
 This amendment specifies that the accused has the right to be tried 
in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”
28
 
While the Sixth Amendment originally functioned as a vicinage provision 
to guarantee a local jury,
29
 there is no modern practical distinction between 




Venue protections are further codified in Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.
31
 Rule 18 requires the government to “prosecute an 
offense in a district where the offense was committed” unless otherwise 
permitted by statute or federal rule.
32
 This rule does not change the scope of 
proper venue in a criminal trial, but “simply codifies the constitutional 
mandates that a defendant be tried in a state where the crime was 
committed, before an impartial jury of that district.”
33
 
Although venue was undoubtedly important to the Framers, courts have 
struggled to clearly articulate the policies that make venue so crucial.
34
 
Though the Supreme Court has urged courts to respect “the underlying 
spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage,”
35
 the Second 
Circuit has argued this direction falls short.
36
 Without precise guidance, 
courts have tried to balance the interests of the accused, the government, 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. 
 27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 28. Id.  
 29. William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage 
and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1944). 
 30. Robert L. Ullmann, One Hundred Years After Hyde: Time to Expand Venue 
Safeguards in Federal Criminal Conspiracy Cases?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1003, 1007 
(2012). 
 31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
 32. Id.  
 33. United States v. Fry, 413 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d 
1221 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 34. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 35. Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 90, 105 (1983) [hereinafter Obstruction of Justice Puzzle] (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944)).  
 36. See Reed, 773 F.2d at 480 (“[T]he precise policies to be furthered by venue law are 
not clearly defined. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has yet to articulate a coherent definition of the 
underlying policies.”). 
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witnesses, and the courts themselves.
37
 As a result, several different policy 
justifications have guided courts tackling issues of criminal venue.  
The first of these broad policy justifications is fairness to the accused.
38
 
Historically, proper venue ensured a fair trial by guaranteeing to the 
accused the right to be tried in his community.
39
 A local trial ensured the 
accused had access to relevant evidence to build his case, friends and 
relatives to act as character witnesses, and local counsel to prepare a 
defense.
40
 Though these policies may seem outdated now,
41
 forcing a 
defendant to travel to a distant district to present his defense still imposes a 
financial burden.
42
 Venue protections also prevent the government from 
winning a conviction by simply separating a defendant from relevant facts, 
witnesses, and evidence.
43
 Without venue protections, the prosecution could 
survey unrelated districts to find the jury that would be most sympathetic to 
its case. Venue protections aim to preclude that precise “governmental 
abuse[] of power.”
44
 In determining whether venue is fair to the accused, 
courts scrutinize whether the government is forum shopping to gain an 
advantage.
45
 In fact, even the mere appearance of governmental abuse in 
selecting “what may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the prosecution” has 
troubled the Supreme Court.
46
 A prosecutor intentionally cherry-picking an 
unfair district harkens back to King George’s attempts to gain an advantage 
by trying colonists in England. This parallel clarifies why courts have no 
patience for even a vestige of governmental abuse. 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Ullmann, supra note 30, at 1009.  
 38. See United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) (“The provision for trial in the 
vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an 
accused is prosecuted in a remote place.”); see also Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275; United States 
v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 258 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 39. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 808–09 (1976). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See United States v. Hart-Williams, 967 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(criticizing the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause as “a relic of a bygone era when jurors 
decided cases on the basis of personal knowledge”). 
 42. Johnson, 323 U.S. at 278. 
 43. See Kershen, supra note 39, at 809 (“For any accused, trial at a distant location 
would be inconvenient and expensive. For an accused of limited means, trial at a distant 
location could, in effect, mean a complete inability to present a defense to the charge.”). 
 44. United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999). 
 45. Mogin, supra note 22, at 58. 
 46. Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275.  
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A second policy justification is fairer administration of justice, which is 
ensured by better factfinding.
47
 Venue is typically only proper in the district 
in which the accused committed the crime.
48
 Because the government must 
try the crime in the district where the crime occurred, fact witnesses are 
generally more accessible to both the defense and the prosecution.
49
 
Similarly, both parties have better access to evidence in the district where 
the criminal behavior occurred because most relevant evidence is likely to 
be located there.
50
 When both the government and the accused have easy, 
unobstructed access to evidence and fact witnesses, each can build a case 
on the merits. On the other hand, holding “trial in a distant state or territory 




A third major policy justification courts may consider in venue analyses 
is convenience.
52
 In some cases, this policy promotes broadening the scope 
of venue to more efficiently administer justice.
53
 As federal laws have 
increased in both quantity and complexity, the government can now charge 
a person with several different federal criminal offenses predicated upon the 
same underlying behavior.
54
 Trying these complex cases may require the 
government to bring dozens of different charges in several different districts 
to ensure proper venue.
55
 But this justification likely holds little power on 
its own. When a prosecutor brings an array of charges based on the same 
criminal behavior, courts will not authorize improper venue for any single 
charge, even if it is easier and more cost effective for the government to 
bring its entire case in one courthouse.
56
 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 106. 
 48. See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 5 (1998). 
 49. Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 106. 
 50. Id. at 106–07. 
 51. Mogin, supra note 22, at 57 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION § 1775 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833)). 
 52. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 541–42 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v. 
Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998)). 
 53. See Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, supra note 35, at 108. 
 54. Mogin, supra note 22, at 59. 
 55. See id. at 59–60. 
 56. See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 536–37 (3d Cir. 2014) (clarifying 
that “substantial contacts” cannot expand the scope of venue but can only limit it); see also 
Christopher W. Pratt, Comment, “I’m Being Prosecuted Where?” Venue Under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(C)(1), 37 HOUS. L. REV. 893, 920 (2000) (“The government’s having limited resources 
does not justify a public policy argument for compromising a defendant’s constitutional right 
to a trial in the district where the crime is committed.”). 
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II. Each Branch’s Role in Venue 
All three branches of government play an important role in determining 
and enforcing proper venue—either by action or inaction. This section will 
explore how the legislative, executive, and judicial branches each interpret 
venue protections generally and as they relate to sky crimes. 
A. The Legislative Branch 
When writing new legislation, Congress can designate proper venue by 
including an express venue provision within a statute.
57
 In the absence of 
such a provision, proper venue is instead determined by “the locus delicti, 
or scene of the crime.”
58
 To establish the locus delicti, courts consider the 
“nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or the acts 
constituting it.”
59
 Because Congress chooses which specific behavior to 
criminalize when drafting federal statutes, legislators implicitly define the 
locus delicti when they designate the acts constituting a crime. Without an 
express venue provision, therefore, courts analyzing a venue challenge must 
instead look to the specific behavior that Congress chose to criminalize.
60
 
Congress may also expressly define the locus delicti of a particular crime.
61
 
Though technically different than an express venue provision, a defined 
locus delicti similarly eliminates the court’s need to determine the criminal 
acts constituting the offense.  
Though Congress has not passed a widely applicable venue statute for 
crimes committed on airplanes, it has codified jurisdictional requirements 
for crimes committed in the “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(A) (2018) (specifying that money laundering charges 
may be brought in “any district in which the financial or monetary transaction” occurred); 21 
U.S.C. § 17 (2018) (limiting venue for mislabeling dairy or food products to the district in 
which the mislabeling occurred); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) (2018) (specifying that charges for 
witness tampering “may be brought” either in the district where the proceeding “was 
intended to be affected” or in the district where the obstructive behavior occurred).  
 58. 8A BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION § 
22:64 (2015), 8A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 22:64 (Westlaw).  
 59. Id.; United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied 
sub nom. Thomas v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 342 (2018), and cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 342 
(2018) (quoting United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 60. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33223, VENUE: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF WHERE A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 3 (2018). 
 61. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (2018) (defining the locus delicti for manslaughter as 
“the place where the injury was inflicted, or the poison administered or other means 
employed which caused the death, without regard to the place where the death occurs”). 
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—to be tried in federal court, thereby eliminating the need to 
determine which state has jurisdiction over the crime.
65
  
B. The Executive Branch 
The executive branch’s role in venue determinations is triggered when a 
prosecutor decides to file federal charges in a particular district. Federal 
prosecutors, part of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the executive 
branch,
66
 carry the burden of proof to show that venue is proper in criminal 
trials.
67
 Because proper venue is typically not viewed as “an ‘element’ of 
the crime,”
68
 it must only be proven “by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”
69
 Whether venue is proper is a question of fact.
70
  
Additionally, the DOJ’s Justice Manual
71
 provides internal guidance to 
prosecutors by clarifying DOJ policies and procedures.
72
 Though it does not 
carry the force of law, the Deputy Attorney General prepares the Justice 
Manual under the supervision of the Attorney General.
73
 The Justice 
Manual’s Criminal Resource Manual (“CRM”) specifically contemplates 
the issue of venue for sky crimes, arguing that venue should be “proper in 
                                                                                                                 
 62. 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2018); see infra Section V.A. 
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2018) (federally criminalizing murder on airplanes). 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2018) (federally criminalizing simple assault on airplanes); 18 
U.S.C. § 2244 (2018) (federally criminalizing sexual assaults on airplanes). 
 65. United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 66. Melissa McNamara, The Role of U.S. Attorneys, CBS NEWS (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:22 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-role-of-us-attorneys/. 
 67. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 
Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Conteh, 2 F. App’x 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[V]enue is 
not an ‘element’ of the crime in the formal sense.” (citing United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 
377, 382 (2d. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000))); United States v. Miller, 111 
F.3d 747, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (outlining the “significant differences between venue and 
substantive elements of the crime”); United States v. Massa, 686 F.2d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 
1982) (“[V]enue . . . is an element more akin to jurisdiction than to the substantive elements 
of the crime.”). 
 69. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. The Justice Manual was previously known as the United States Attorneys’ Manual. 
Wick Sollers et al., DOJ Issues Updated U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/practice/2019/ 
doj-issues-updated-us-attorneys-manual/. 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-1.100–200 (2018), https://www.justice. 
gov/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction. 
 73. Id. § 1-1.200. 
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the district in which the aircraft land[s].”
74
 Though this guidance is not 
binding on the courts, judges may still give weight to it by treating the 
CRM as persuasive authority in sky crime cases.
75
  
C. The Judicial Branch 
Courts must analyze each individual venue challenge based on the 
specific statute and facts involved.
76
 Even if Congress has included a venue 
provision in the statute at issue, the court must still ensure that the provision 
operates within the scope of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.
77
 An 
extra layer of complexity arises when criminal behavior spans across 
multiple districts. Though several circuit courts and the Supreme Court 
have addressed this issue, competing standards have emerged and some 
confusion still remains. 
1. The Substantial Contacts Test 
The Second Circuit has taken a broader approach to venue when “the 
acts constituting the crime and the nature of the crime charged implicate 
more than one location.”
78
 In United States v. Reed, the court grappled with 
the imprecise policy justifications underlying proper venue.
79
 The Reed 
court ultimately concluded that “fairness to defendants cannot be the sole 
grounds for determining venue because the most convenient venue for them 
may often have little, if any, connection with the crimes charged.”
80
 Instead, 
the court adopted a “substantial contacts rule,” which considered four 
factors: (1) “the site of the defendant’s acts,” (2) “the elements and nature 
of the crime,” (3) “the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct,” and (4) 
“the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.”
81
 After Reed, the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL § 1406 (1999), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-
1406-aircraft-piracy-interference-and-other-title-49-aircraft-offenses [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL]. 
 75. See Kristie Xian, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the 
Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 649 n.123 
(2014) (“As internal policy manuals, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and U.S. Department of 
Justice Criminal Resource Manual . . . are given weight based upon their power to 
persuade.”) (citations omitted). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 77. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 481. 
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Second Circuit “alternately applied and ignored the substantial contacts 
test.”
82






 Circuits have used or 






 Circuits have both 
expressly rejected it. Two decades after Reed, the Supreme Court 
introduced a new test in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno.
89
 While the 
Rodriguez-Moreno test did not explicitly overrule the substantial contacts 
test, the Second Circuit’s approach has certainly “lost force as precedent.”
90
 
2. The Essential Conduct Elements Test  
The Supreme Court weighed in on the process for determining proper 
venue in Rodriguez-Moreno.
91
 There, an east coast drug dealer stole 
cocaine from a distributor during a drug deal in Texas.
92
 The distributor 
then hired the defendant and others to track down the drug dealer.
93
 In an 
effort to find the drug dealer, the defendant held a middleman hostage on a 
trip from Texas to the east coast.
94
 After spending several days in New 
Jersey, the kidnappers then took the middleman to New York, and finally to 
Maryland.
95
 After arriving in Maryland, the defendant obtained a pistol, 
held the gun to the middleman’s head, and threatened to shoot.
96
 The 
middleman eventually escaped and called the police, who arrested the 
kidnappers.
97
 The defendant was charged with conspiring to kidnap the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 83. See United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 423 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986).  
 84. See United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1993). But see United States 
v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Our reasoning in Cofield, however, cannot 
be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez–
Moreno.”). 
 85. See United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 86. Mogin, supra note 22, at 39. 
 87. United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 88. United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 536–37 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 89. 526 U.S. 275 (1999). 
 90. David Spears, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Strange Duck, CHAMPION, 
Jan./Feb. 2019, at 24, 28. 
 91. 526 U.S. at 279–80. One year earlier, the Court promulgated a similar rule in 
relation to a money laundering statute in United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1998). 
 92. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 276. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 276–77. 
 95. Id. at 277.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
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middleman, kidnapping the middleman, and “using and carrying a firearm 
in relation to” the kidnapping.
98
 The government brought the charges in the 
District of New Jersey, but the defendant argued that venue for the firearm 
charge was improper because Maryland was the only place the government 
could prove “he had actually used a gun.”
99
  
The Third Circuit, relying on the specific verbs in the statute, agreed 
with the defendant’s argument that venue for the firearms charge was 
improper in New Jersey.
100
 The government had prosecuted the defendant 
under a statute that barred “us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm” “during and in 
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”
101
 The court 
reasoned that since the defendant only “used” or “carried” the gun in 
Maryland, venue would only be proper there.
102
 Because its ruling would 
force prosecutors to try the gun crime in a different venue than the 
kidnapping crime, the court’s approach eschewed judicial economy in favor 
of strict constitutional venue protections. 
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Third Circuit, holding 
that venue was proper in New Jersey for both the kidnapping and the 
firearm charges.
103
 The Court, reasoning that any venue inquiry must begin 
with determining the locus delicti of the crime,
104
 set forth a two-prong test 
for making this determination.
105
 First, a court must “identify the conduct 
constituting the offense,” and then it must “discern the location of the 
commission” of that conduct.
106
 While the lower court relied on the specific 
verbs within the statute to satisfy the first prong of the test, the Supreme 
Court took a broader approach to identifying the criminalized conduct.
107
 
Rather than analyzing verbs alone, the Court looked at the “essential 
conduct elements” of the crime.
108
 In the Court’s view, the venue inquiry 
turns on whether the statutory language constitutes an element of the crime 
the government must prove to win its case, regardless of the words’ 
grammatical properties.
109
 Using this lens, the Court found two “essential 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 278. 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
 102. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 278. 
 103. Id. at 281–82. 
 104. See id. at 279; see supra Section II.A. 
 105. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 279–80.  
 108. Id. at 280.  
 109. See id. 
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conduct elements” in the statute at issue: (1) using a firearm and (2) 
committing a crime of violence—in this case, a kidnapping.
110
 The Court 
reasoned that because the kidnapping began in Texas and continued through 
New Jersey, New York, and Maryland, it did not make sense to break the 
kidnapping down into “discrete geographic fragments.”
111
 Because the 
statute criminalized using a gun “during and in relation to” the kidnapping, 




In Rodriguez-Moreno, the Court also determined that kidnapping 
qualifies as a “continuing offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).
113
 When 
criminal behavior takes place in more than one district, venue is proper in 
“any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”
114
 
Under § 3237(a), crimes involving interstate commerce qualify as 
continuing offenses.
115
 As a result, venue is proper for those crimes in “any 
district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.”
116
  
III. Two Approaches to Venue for Crimes Committed 
on Domestic Commercial Flights 
Courts disagree, however, on whether § 3237(a)’s reach extends to every 
crime committed during a commercial flight. The Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that the criminal behavior itself must implicate interstate 
commerce in order to qualify as a continuing offense.
117
 The Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that any criminal behavior occurring during 
interstate travel automatically qualifies as a continuing offense and 
therefore falls within § 3237(a)’s purview.
118
 The Supreme Court has not 
yet weighed in on the issue, resulting in a circuit split.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 281. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 282.  
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). 
 118. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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A. Ninth Circuit’s Approach: Flyover District Only 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a narrow interpretation of venue in 
relation to sky crimes. Its approach requires the government to prosecute 




In Lozoya, one passenger struck another in the face during a flight from 
Minneapolis to Los Angeles during a skirmish that began and ended in an 
instant.
120
 The Ninth Circuit relied on the two-prong test set forth in 
Rodriguez-Moreno to determine the locus delicti of the criminal offense.
121
 
In applying that test, the court first established the essential elements of the 
criminal conduct and then determined where that conduct occurred.
122
 
Lozoya deviated from the norm because the first half of the analysis was 
very straightforward.
123
 The specific conduct criminalized—the slap—was 
undisputed and clear cut.
124
 To satisfy the second prong of the test, the court 




The government first contended the crime was a continuing offense 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), so venue was proper in the district where the 
plane landed.
126
 Section 3237(a) provides that an offense involving “the use 
of . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce . . . is a continuing 
offense and . . . may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, 
through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.”
127
 A continuing offense 




The crux of the government’s argument under § 3237(a) was that the 
assault charge involved interstate commerce because it occurred on a 
commercial flight that moved passengers between states.
129
 The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed, noting that even though the assault happened on a plane, 
nothing about the charged criminal behavior itself implicated interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1241. 
 120. Id. at 1233–34; see also supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
 121. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1238–39; see supra Section II.C.2. 
 122. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239.  
 123. See id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1239, 1241.  
 126. Id. at 1239.  
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018).  
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240. 
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 The court reasoned that the criminalized behavior “occurred 
in an instant” and was over long before the plane entered the Central 
District of California for its landing at LAX.
131
 Because the plane’s 
subsequent flight activity was separate from the actual criminal behavior, 
the court concluded it was “incidental and therefore irrelevant for venue 
purposes.”
132
 The court deemed the fact that the crime occurred on an 
airplane merely a “circumstance element,” as opposed to an element of the 
crime.
133
 Because only criminalized behavior can support proper venue, the 
fact that the slap occurred on an airplane did not somehow convert it to a 
continuing offense under § 3237(a), and venue was therefore improper in 
the arrival district.
134
 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its decision 
created a circuit split with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, but it ultimately 




The government next argued that venue was proper because the crime 
was not committed in any district.
136
 When crimes are “begun or 
committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district,” 
venue is proper “in the district in which the offender . . . is arrested or is 
first brought.”
137
 The court quickly disposed of this argument because the 
statute only applies when an “offense [is] committed entirely on the high 
seas or outside the United States.”
138
 The court distinguished the “high 
skies” from the “high seas” because “the navigable airspace above [a] 
district is a part of the district.”
139
 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, venue was proper only in the 
district “above which the assault occurred.”
140
 Though the government 
urged that pinpointing the exact location of the plane during the assault 
would be “impossible,” the court rejected that argument.
141
 Conceding that 
it would require some investigation to determine the plane’s location, the 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 1239–40. 
 131. Id. at 1239.  
 132. Id. (citing United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 133. Id. at 1240 (quoting Stinson, 647 F.3d at 1204).  
 134. Id. at 1239. 
 135. Id. at 1240 (quoting United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 136. Id. at 1241.  
 137. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018). 
 138. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1241 (quoting United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 139. Id. (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1241–42.  
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court still felt the government’s task—proving venue by a preponderance of 
the evidence—was a “wholly reasonable” one for it to tackle.
142
 
The Ninth Circuit did recognize the “creeping absurdity in [its] 
holding.”
143
 But rather than adopting what it believed to be the more 
practical rule, the court instead urged Congress to act by passing legislation 
to address the issue in a “just, sensible, and clearly articulated” rule.
144
 
B. Tenth & Eleventh Circuits’ Approach: Departure District, Any Flyover 
District, or Arrival District 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have taken a broader approach to 
interpreting venue for crimes committed on commercial flights. While the 
Ninth Circuit limited proper venue to a single flyover district,
145
 the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits have held that venue for sky crimes is proper in the 
landing district, the departure district, and any flyover district.
146
 
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue in United States v. 
McCulley.
147
 In that case, three men conspired to steal United States mail 
during a nonstop flight from Los Angeles to Atlanta.
148
 One of the men 
locked himself in a trunk, unbeknownst to airline employees who loaded 
the trunk near several mail bags in the belly of the plane.
149
 During the 
flight, the man freed himself from the trunk, tore open the bags, and 
pilfered through the mail.
150
 He then loaded stolen mail into his own 
luggage, which was intended for transfer onto a connecting flight.
151
 After 
the plane landed in Atlanta, however, airline employees discovered the man 
when his trunk popped open during baggage unloading.
152
 The conspiracy 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. at 1242. 
 143. Id. (“Should it really be necessary for the government to pinpoint where precisely in 
the spacious skies an alleged assault occurred? Imagine an inflight robbery or homicide—or 
some other nightmare at 20,000 feet—that were to occur over the northeastern United States, 
home to three circuits, fifteen districts, and a half-dozen major airports, all in close 
proximity. How feasible would it be for the government to prove venue in such cluttered 
airspace?”). 
 144. Id. at 1243.  
 145. Id. at 1241.  
 146. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 147. 673 F.2d at 349. 
 148. Id. at 348. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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unraveled after employees realized that several mail bags were missing and 
that there was other luggage resembling the trunk, which investigators used 
to bait the man’s co-conspirators.
153
 Police arrested all three men in the 
Northern District of Georgia—the district where the plane landed.
154
 
Prosecutors in the Northern District brought charges under several federal 
statutes,
155
 including 18 U.S.C. § 1706, which prohibits injury to mail bags 
“with the intent to rob or steal any such mail.”
156
  
Only the two co-conspirators who were not in the trunk raised venue 
challenges.
157
 They argued venue would only be proper in the Northern 
District of Georgia if the government could prove either that the criminal 
conduct was a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) or that the men 
injured the bags in that district.
158
 The court rejected their argument, 
holding any violation of § 1706 that “occurs on some form of transportation 
in interstate or foreign commerce” automatically qualifies as a “continuing 
violation” under § 3237(a).
159
 To hold otherwise would allow “a crime 
which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment” solely 
because the government could not satisfy the venue requirement.
160
 The 
court believed the scenario at hand was “precisely [the] sort of situation that 
18 U.S.C. § 3237 was meant to deal with.”
161
 Section 3237(a), the court 
reasoned, functioned as a “catchall provision” to relieve Congress from 




While the Eleventh Circuit did consider the potential complications 
presented by the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18,
163
 the court ultimately relied on the policy justifications underlying 
those rules to support its stance.
164
 Specifically, venue protections function 
to “prevent abuses” such as forcing a person who committed a robbery in 
one state to face a jury trial in a different state.
165
 The court distinguished 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 349. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 1706 (2018).  
 157. McCulley, 673 F.2d at 349. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 350. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 350 n.2; see supra Part I. 
 164. McCulley, 673 F.2d at 350 n.2. 
 165. Id. 
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the instant case because the conspirators “voluntarily entered the Northern 
District of Georgia with the intent to further the ends of the conspiracy.”
166
 
Because its broad interpretation of § 3237(a) did not implicate the abuses 
contemplated by constitutional safeguards, the Eleventh Circuit believed its 
holding did not undermine the Sixth Amendment or Rule 18.
167
  
IV. Both Existing Approaches Are Unworkable for Sky Crimes 
The Ninth Circuit’s strict interpretation of venue requirements produces 
absurd results and puts an unreasonably high burden on the government to 
prove venue for crimes committed on airplanes. While the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ approach seems more sensible on its face, allowing such 
a broad range of venue options gives the government too much latitude and 
infringes upon defendants’ constitutional rights.  
A. The Ninth Circuit’s “Too Narrow” Approach 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya, venue for noncontinuous 
sky crimes is only proper in the district above which the plane was flying 
when the crime occurred. This approach creates unnecessary hardships and 
produces undesirable results. Specifically, it may pose an insurmountable 
hurdle for the government, run contrary to constitutional and congressional 
goals, make it more difficult for victims to get redress, produce inconsistent 
results, and disregard other procedural safeguards.  
The Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of venue places a high burden 
on the government and compels prosecutors to bring charges for crimes 
committed on airplanes in an arbitrary district. The government must first 
identify the moment that the criminal behavior occurred and then determine 
the precise location of the airplane at that point in time.
168
 Though 
technological advances allow relatively easy access to information about a 
plane’s physical location,
169
 a narrow interpretation still raises unnecessary 
hurdles.  
Pinpointing the location of the plane at the moment of the crime forces 
the government to put an exact timestamp on the criminal behavior. 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1242 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). 
 169. See Robert Silk, All Commercial Aircraft in U.S. Will Soon Have GPS Technology, 
TRAVEL WKLY. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/ 
Commercial-aircraft-GPS-technology. 
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Admittedly, this requirement did not present a problem in Lozoya because 
the commotion immediately alerted flight attendants and other passengers 
who were able to document the time.
170
 But if a defendant acted less 
overtly, determining the precise time the behavior occurred could present 
an insurmountable hurdle.  
Imagine that instead of two adults openly brawling on a plane, the crime 
involved an adult passenger quietly preying on an unaccompanied minor. If 
the child failed to immediately alert a flight attendant or note the time of the 
assault, the government may lack the information necessary to prove proper 
venue.
171
 The difficulty of this task would also depend on the plane’s flight 
path. A prosecutor would have a much smaller margin of error for flights 
traversing the east coast—where federal judicial districts are more densely 
packed—because the plane would fly over each district for a shorter 
duration. The hypothetical child’s access to justice should not rest on her 
ability to recall enough details surrounding her assault to determine whether 
it happened at 6 p.m. or 7 p.m. Though the government carries a lower 
burden of proof for venue than it does for other elements of the crime,
172
 
circumstances like these could still make it impossible to meet that burden. 
While venue requirements generally protect a defendant from 
prosecution in an unfair district,
173
 a rigid and literal interpretation of venue 
on airplanes flouts those fairness concerns. A narrow interpretation could 
actually force the government to bring charges in an unfamiliar district 
hundreds of miles away from relevant evidence, witnesses, or parties. For 
every cross-country flight between two major cities, it is likely that many of 
the passengers live in either the city the plane took off from or the city 
where it landed.
174
 While some passengers may be visiting for the first time 
or catching a connecting flight, most probably have some business or 
personal connection to either the departure or arrival city. In contrast, far 
fewer passengers are likely to live in, work in, or be familiar with any given 
district over which the plane flies. Moreover, forcing proper venue in a 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1242 (explaining the specific circumstances that allowed 
flight attendants to determine the time of the assault). 
 171. Federal jurisdiction is proper for sexual assaults committed on airplanes under 18 
U.S.C. § 2244 (2018). 
 172. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012); Spears, supra note 
90, at 24. 
 173. See supra Part I. 
 174. For example, Lozoya was flying back to California because she had to work the 
following day. Brief for Appellant at 11, United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1291 (2019) 
(No. 17-50336), 2018 WL 1064506, at *11. While her brief does not specify precisely where 
she lives, it is likely within driving distance of LAX.  
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random flyover district may impede witnesses’ availability to testify in 
person. In a dissent, Justice Harlan stressed that proper venue “is a 
safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is 
prosecuted in a remote place.”
175
 He further urged courts to construe 
statutes in a way that “respect[s] such considerations.”
176
 In Justice Harlan’s 
view, courts give more respect to the Sixth Amendment’s protections by 
finding proper venue where “witnesses and relevant circumstances 
surrounding the contested issues” are most likely to be found.
177
 
A narrow interpretation not only fails to promote fairness to the 
defendant, but also fosters unfairness to victims.
178
 By placing such a high 
burden on the government to bring charges and prove venue in a far-flung 
district, a narrow interpretation creates a loophole for criminals to avoid 
prosecution. Under the two-prong Rodriguez-Moreno test, courts must: (1) 
“identify the conduct constituting the offense” and (2) “discern the location 
of the commission” of the criminal conduct.
179
 In Rodriguez-Moreno, the 
uncertainty rested in the first prong as the Court struggled to determine the 
behavior Congress intended to criminalize.
180
 In Lozoya, though, the first 
prong was not at issue since the specific conduct being criminalized—the 
slap—was not contested.
181
 Only the second prong, determining where the 
slap occurred, was uncertain. Applying the Rodriguez-Moreno framework 
to crimes committed on airplanes requires the government to pinpoint the 
plane’s precise location at a specific, but potentially unknown time. Even if 
the government can prove all other elements of the crime, its case could still 
fail if this burden is not met. Additionally, forcing prosecutors to obtain and 
review flight records just to determine which district has proper venue 
expends time and resources not required if the defendant is simply charged 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958)).  
 176. Id. (quoting Cores, 356 U.S. at 407). 
 177. Id. 
 178. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he criminal justice system is not 
operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.” Kelly 
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986). But a glaring loophole in criminal procedure laws that 
creates a safe harbor for crime on airplanes arguably works to the detriment of all travelers, 
not just individual victims. 
 179. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999); see supra Section 
II.C.2. 
 180. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 281. 
 181. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
390 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:371 
 
 
in the district where the plane lands. As a result, requiring the government 
to pinpoint the plane’s physical location may act as an obstacle for victims 
seeking redress.  
The Framers could not possibly have contemplated commercial airflight 
when they drafted constitutional venue protections. Congress, however, has 
passed certain legislation that points to its intention to avoid this tricky 
venue scenario. In his separate opinion in Lozoya, Judge Owens suggested 
that Congress already addressed many of the concerns associated with 
commercial air travel when it passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1961.
182
 
At the time, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
highlighted the exact concern eventually presented in Lozoya:  
[S]erious legal questions can arise as to the situs of the aircraft at 
the time the crime was committed. The question as to the law of 
which jurisdiction should apply to a given offense can be the 
subject of endless debate, and excessive delay in the prosecution 
becomes inevitable. The difficulties encountered by the 
overflown State in collecting evidence sufficient to support an 
indictment are obvious. . . . To contrast, if the offense were also 
a crime under Federal law, the aircraft would be met on landing 
by Federal officers. The offender could be taken into custody 
immediately and the criminal prosecution instituted.
183
 
Though the factual scenario envisioned by the administrator came to 
fruition in Lozoya, the court’s narrow interpretation of venue inhibited the 
desired and intended result. 
A narrow venue rule also produces inconsistent results when the assault 
occurs above water instead of above land.
184
 Thus, the government’s ability 
to satisfy proper venue could hinge on an air traffic controller’s fortuitous 
decision to route an east coast flight over the Atlantic rather than the 
Beltway.
185
 A crime that occurred on a plane flying above water would 
most likely be tried in the landing district since crimes occurring over the 
ocean technically do not occur in any district.
186
 But if the same behavior 
occurred on a plane that took the land route, the government would have to 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See id. at 1243–44 (Owens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 183. Id. at 1244 (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)); see infra Section V.A.  
 184. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018). 
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pinpoint the location of the plane at the moment of the assault and 
prosecute the defendant in a potentially unfamiliar district.
187
 
Finally, a narrow interpretation needlessly disregards another procedural 
safeguard that promotes fairness to the defendant—venue transfer. The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow criminal defendants to move to 
transfer trial proceedings to a different district.
188
 The court must grant a 
transfer if prejudice in the original district eliminates the defendant’s ability 
to “obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”
189
 Even if the defendant is not 
facing such prejudice, he can still move to transfer the case for “the 
convenience of the parties, any victim, and the witnesses, and in the interest 
of justice.”
190
 When considering whether to grant a motion to transfer for 
convenience, courts have “substantial discretion to balance any competing 
interests.”
191
 If a defendant successfully moves for a transfer, the judge then 
selects the transferee district.
192
 Rule 21 empowers the court to weigh all 
relevant factors and decide whether venue would be more appropriate in a 
different district.
193
 Rule 21 does not solve the venue puzzle as it relates to 
airplane crimes, though, because a defendant retains his constitutional 
venue protections until he moves for venue transfer.
194
 Thus, only after a 
defendant makes a Rule 21 motion does he waive his constitutional right to 
be tried in the district where the crime occurred.
195
 
B. The Tenth & Eleventh Circuits’ “Too Broad” Approach 
Though a narrow interpretation of venue protections raises concerns, so 
too does an overbroad interpretation. Specifically, this approach presents 
opportunities for prosecutorial abuse, weakens already vulnerable 
constitutional protections, and allows judges to legislate from the bench.  
                                                                                                                 
 187. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406. 
 188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21. 
 189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). 
 190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). 
 191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.  
 192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
Empowering the court to balance interests in a particular factual scenario is reminiscent of 
the substantial contacts venue rule in Reed. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)–(b) advisory committee’s note to 1944 amendment. 
 195. Id. 
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The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that venue for sky crimes is 
proper in any district through which a plane travels.
196
 Rather than 
distinguishing between crimes that are ongoing and those that take place in 
an instant, these courts have held that all crimes committed on commercial 
flights fall under § 3237(a) because they inherently involve interstate 
commerce.
197
 This broad approach to sky-crime venue is ripe for 
prosecutorial abuse because it allows the government to choose between 
several districts even though the crime happened in only one location. Since 
all airplane crimes implicate “the use of . . . interstate or foreign commerce” 
under § 3237(a), venue is therefore proper “in any district from, through, or 
into which such commerce . . . moves.”
198
 Under this interpretation, the 
government could choose to bring charges in the district where the plane 
departed, in the district where the plane arrived, or in any district in which it 
flew above.  
This approach is troubling because the government’s burden to prove 
proper venue is already lower than its burden to prove the elements of the 
crime.
199
 Though the government must prove the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it must only prove proper venue by a 
preponderance of evidence.
200
 Eroding the protection even further risks 
transforming venue into a mere formality in defiance of Supreme Court 
guidance.
201
 Unlike many other procedural safeguards in the criminal 
justice system, a defendant may waive his objection to venue if the 
objection is untimely.
202
 Thus, the scope of a defendant’s constitutional 
venue protection is already limited, and the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
approach constrains it even further.  
This broader approach also arguably allows the court to legislate from 
the bench. The Eleventh Circuit in McCulley interpreted § 3237(a) as a 
“catchall provision” for venue.
203
 Its scant analysis, however, relied entirely 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 
346, 349–50 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 197. See Cope, 676 F.3d at 1225; Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1253; McCulley, 673 F.2d at 
350. 
 198. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018) (emphasis added).  
 199. Spears, supra note 90, at 24. 
 200. United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012); Spears, supra note 
90, at 24.  
 201. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) (“Questions of venue in 
criminal cases, therefore, are not merely matters of formal legal procedure.”). 
 202. See United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 203. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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on analogous state statutes rather than constitutional guidance or federal 
precedent.
204
 The court reasoned that the statute was “designed to prevent a 
crime which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment for 
lack of venue,” though it did not cite any legislative history to support that 
claim.
205
 The Ninth Circuit took issue with the McCulley court’s reliance on 
state statutes.
206
 The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[q]uestions of 
venue in criminal cases . . . raise deep issues of public policy in the light of 
which legislation must be construed.”
207
 A court’s interpretation of a statute 
“should go in the direction of constitutional policy even though not 
commanded by it.”
208
 In the context of proper venue, this guidance may 
encourage courts to favor a narrower construction—one that adheres to the 
“underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage”—
over a broader construction that may more sensibly justify venue in another 
district.
209
 Thus, if the legislative history of § 3237(a) is genuinely unclear 
regarding congressional intent, courts should hesitate to interpret it broadly.  
While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ approach helps avoid absurd 
results, it may also defy the explicit protections guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, Article III, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Without clear direction from Congress, judicial decisions about proper 
venue must be guided by constitutional protections and federal rules.  
V. A Functional Approach: § 3237(a) Encompasses All Sky Crime 
It is clear that courts are not free to disregard the plain text of the 
Constitution or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure based solely on 
policy or good sense.
210
 While the default rule under both of these sources 
requires a crime to be tried in the district where it was committed, Congress 
has the authority to statutorily fix venue for a crime, either by including a 
specific venue provision or expressly defining the locus delicti of the 
crime.
211
 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) provides statutory authority for courts to 
take a sensible approach to criminal venue on airplanes.  
                                                                                                                 
 204. See id.  
 205. Id. 
 206. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 
944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 7064635 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). 
 207. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra Part I.  
 211. See supra Section II.A. 
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Congress’s intent to close the venue loophole in these scenarios is 
evidenced by legislative history, the statutory scheme, and existing 
comprehensive legislation evidencing a sensible approach to criminal 
procedure on airplanes. With this groundwork in mind, courts should adopt 
a functional interpretation of § 3237(a). For sky crimes, this interpretation 
allows courts to balance competing policy concerns, avoid absurd results, 
and shield defendants with the protections envisioned by the Constitution 
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits have adopted a similar approach, they did so without 
thorough analysis and without expressly tempering § 3237(a)’s scope as it 
relates to non-continuous sky crimes. This section provides those missing 
pieces.  
A. Legislative History 
The Lozoya majority, lamenting the absurd result it had reached, stressed 
that the venue problem for sky crimes could only be solved by 
congressional action, not judicial interpretation.
212
 But a functional 
approach to criminal venue on airplanes flows logically from the legislative 
history of § 3237(a). Under that statute, “any offense involving the use 
of . . . interstate or foreign commerce . . . except as otherwise expressly 
provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in 
any district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . or imported 
object or person moves.”
213
 While the Ninth Circuit rejected § 3237(a)’s 
application in Lozoya because the criminal offense did not involve interstate 
commerce,
214
 the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits opted to treat it as a catchall 
provision, finding proper venue in any district through which the plane 
traveled.
215
 The statute’s legislative history tips in favor of the latter 
position. 
In closing the jurisdictional loophole that once existed for airplanes, 
Congress made clear its intent to also close the corresponding venue 
loophole. In the early 1960s, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act 
(“FAA”) to address “gaps in existing law which can operate to provide 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1242–43 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc 
granted, 944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 WL 
7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020). 
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2018). 
 214. See supra Section III.A. 
 215. See supra Section III.B. 
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criminals with a haven from prosecution.”
216
 It accomplished this goal by 
bringing certain violent state crime offenses—like murder and assault—
under federal jurisdiction, thereby eliminating the need to determine which 
state court had jurisdiction over the crime.
217
 The accompanying House 
Report clarified that “it is necessary and appropriate for the legislation to 
have this broad coverage if it is to operate as an effective deterrent to crime 
and promote safety in air commerce.”
218
 Congress identified the issues 
posed by trying state crimes after “the advent of high-speed high-altitude 
flights of modern jet aircraft [] complicated the problem of establishing 
venue for the purposes of prosecution.”
219
 As a result, it amended the FAA 
primarily to “provide federal criminal laws to cover the commission of 
certain acts occurring on board an aircraft, thereby solving problems of 
venue and jurisdiction which had become complicated by” the emergence 
of commercial air travel.
220
 Just like the jurisdictional complications 
recognized by Congress, issues of venue on airplanes similarly allow 
“serious offenses [to go] unpunished because it” may be “impossible to 




Courts can accomplish this legislative goal while remaining faithful to 
the foundational policy concerns which underlie criminal venue. While a 
functional approach may potentially give the court a range of venue 
options, venue should only be proper in a district where those policies are 
served,
222
 similar to the substantial contacts test advanced by the Second 
Circuit in Reed.
223
 Like that test, the functional balancing approach here 
should only serve to limit venue options. To determine proper venue for 
non-continuous sky crimes, courts should consider factors like where the 
defendant resides, whether he will have access to relevant evidence and 
witnesses in the chosen district, and whether the government is forum 
shopping to gain an advantage. Because these policy goals are most likely 
to be served in the departure or arrival district, courts could begin the 
                                                                                                                 
 216. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-
958, at 3 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2563, 2563). 
 217. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2563–65).  
 218. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564). 
 219. United States v. Moradi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643–44 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 87-958, at 3–4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564).  
 220. Id. at 644 (quoting 8A AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 220) (emphasis added).  
 221. Id. at 643–44 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 3–4, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564).  
 222. See supra Part I.  
 223. See supra Section II.C.1. 
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inquiry with the presumption that one of those two districts would satisfy 
these goals.  
This analysis would not necessarily foreclose venue in any flyover 
district if the judge determined that the factors weighed in favor of venue 
there. This sensible approach allows for judicial discretion, avoiding the 
pitfalls of the Ninth Circuit’s rigid interpretation. Unlike the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ approach, where venue is statutorily proper in every 
flyover district,
224
 this approach prioritizes a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights by empowering courts to detect and deter prosecutorial 
abuse or other types of unfairness. 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
The statutory scheme further evidences Congress’s intent to eliminate 
venue loopholes. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts “must [] 
interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the 
statutory context, ‘structure, history, and purpose.’”
225
 The statutes 
surrounding § 3237 similarly aim to eliminate venue loopholes. For 
example, § 3238 regulates criminal behavior committed “out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular State or district” or those “begun or committed 
upon the high seas.”
226
 Section 3240 fixes venue when offenses are 
committed prior to a new district’s creation.
227
 Section 3242 resolves venue 
issues when members of tribes commit certain offenses on reservations.
228
 
These statutes all target situations like the one in Lozoya: outliers where 
standard venue rules do not quite fit.  
Interpreting § 3237’s scope to encompass all sky crimes also produces 
the most sensible result. Consider again the hypothetical scenario where an 
unaccompanied minor is quietly assaulted by an adult passenger.
229
 If this 
assault occurred in a bathroom at LAX prior to takeoff, determining venue 
would be a nonissue. The perpetrator would be charged and prosecuted in 
the judicial district where LAX is located, and the case would fit neatly into 
the Rodriguez-Moreno framework. But if the assault instead took place an 
                                                                                                                 
 224. See supra Section III.B. 
 225. Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 
570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013) (resolving a statutory interpretation question using these three tools 
and “common sense, which is a fortunate (though not inevitable) side-benefit of construing 
statutory terms fairly”).  
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2018). 
 227. Id. § 3240. 
 228. Id. § 3242. 
 229. See supra Section IV.A. 
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hour or two later, while the plane was midflight, the perpetrator could slip 
through the Lozoya loophole. In that case, the adult’s prosecution would 
rely on the child’s ability to recall enough details of the assault to determine 
the time at which it occurred—a fact required to prove proper venue under 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach—by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Under the two-prong test set forth in Rodriguez-Moreno, the government 
must first identify the criminal behavior and then identify the district where 
that behavior occurred.
230
 In this hypothetical, even if the government had 
ample evidence to prove that the perpetrator assaulted the child, the case 
would still fail on the second prong of the test. The perpetrator would evade 
prosecution based solely on the lack of evidence about the position of the 
plane in relation to some specific instance in time. The Framers included 
venue protections in the Constitution in two separate instances in an effort 
to prevent the government from unfairly prosecuting its citizens in an 
unfamiliar district.
231
 That intention is not served by allowing crime to go 
unpunished simply because it occurs in the skies rather than on the ground. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “interpretations of a statute which 
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations 
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”
232
 Here, a more 
flexible interpretation of § 3237(a) heeds that guidance. 
Admittedly, these tools of statutory interpretation are only applicable 
when ambiguity exists in the statute.
233
 The Ninth Circuit in Lozoya argued 
that the plain language of § 3237(a) forecloses a functional approach 
because the slap itself was not an “offense involving the use of . . . 
interstate or foreign commerce.”
234
 This textualist argument hinges on what 
it means for a crime to “involv[e] the use of . . . interstate commerce,” 
which may not be as straightforward as the court assumes. The statute does 
not require the offense to go so far as to affect or impact interstate 
commerce, but merely to “involv[e]” it. To be sure, the slap itself did not 
implicate interstate commerce. But Congress adopted legislation which 
transformed traditional state crimes (like murder and assault) into federal 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See supra notes 105–99 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.  
 232. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982).  
 233. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (“Thus, our 
inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”). 
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir.), reh'g 
en banc granted, 944 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh'g en banc, No. 17-50336, 2020 
WL 7064635 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2020).  
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crimes when they are committed on airplanes,
235
 and commercial flights 
undoubtedly implicate interstate commerce. The government charged the 
plaintiff in Lozoya under a statute specific to assaults committed in the 
special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.
236
 In this way, the crime 
involves—or “relate[s] closely”
237
—to interstate commerce.  
Courts disagree about how closely the offense must relate to interstate 
commerce before § 3237(a) is triggered. Some courts have applied 
§ 3237(a) when the criminal behavior has a more attenuated connection to 
interstate commerce.
238
 Other courts have taken a more stringent approach, 
requiring a direct connection between the criminal behavior and interstate 
commerce.
239
 The former approach, however, is the best interpretation for 
sky assaults like the one at issue in Lozoya. It empowers courts to produce 
sensible results that are still grounded in the text of the statute and 
supported by canons of statutory interpretation. 
C. A Comprehensive Legislative Solution 
Existing legislation regarding venue on airplanes also evidences 
congressional intent to comprehensively address the problem. When 
criminal behavior interferes with a crew member—even briefly—under 
certain federal statutes,
240
 venue is proper in any district in which the 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See supra Section II.A. 
 236. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) (2018). 
 237. Involve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 
 238. See, e.g., United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (“As we 
explain below, Mr. Cope was ‘under the influence of alcohol’ during the flight. Because he 
was operating a common carrier in interstate commerce, it is immaterial whether he was 
“under the influence of alcohol” in Colorado.”); United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 
1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (“To establish venue, the government need only show that the crime 
took place on a form of transportation in interstate commerce.”).  
 239. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding § 
3237(a) inapplicable based solely on the fact that a stolen computer was transported from the 
District of Columbia to the defendant’s home in Maryland); United States v. Ayo, 801 F. 
Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (finding § 3237(a) inapplicable after a defendant in 
Louisiana received cash from an undercover police officer in Alabama to settle a gambling 
debt, while also distinguishing McCulley and Breitweiser: “[T]he defendant did not accept 
the proceeds of credit while it was in transit. Nor is this a case where no venue exists outside 
of Section 3237(a).”). 
 240. See 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2018) (applying to any person who “assault[s] or 
intimidat[es] a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the 
performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or 
attendant to perform those duties”); 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2018) (applying certain criminal 
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accused’s behavior was disruptive.
241
 If the behavior is so disruptive that it 
forces an unscheduled emergency landing, venue would certainly be proper 
in the district in which the plane landed.
242
 But even behavior that did not 
interrupt the flight plan could cause flight crew to monitor the passenger’s 
behavior for the remainder of the journey.
243
 In that case, the accused’s 




Additionally, questions of criminal venue related to airplane crimes often 
involve assaults against other passengers. Title 49 U.S.C. § 46506 
criminalizes many such offenses under the “special aircraft jurisdiction of 
the United States.”
245
 From an equity standpoint, it would make sense to 
bring the “enclave offenses in the same venue as the interference charge 
and join them for trial there.”
246
 The legislative history of the predecessor to 
§ 46506 further indicates the statute was “originally enacted to deal with the 
problem that states could not prosecute these offenses because it could not 
be proved that the offense took place over the prosecuting state.”
247
 Thus, a 
functional approach to interpreting proper venue for sky crimes minimizes 
the problem that Congress specifically passed these statutes to address.
248
  
Indeed, a narrow interpretation of § 3237(a) runs contrary to legislative 
goals by causing unnecessary inefficiency and complexity in prosecuting 
the behavior.
249
 Many assaults on other passengers or crew members can 
also be tried as federal interference, and venue is proper for those crimes in 
the district in which the plane lands.
250
 But a narrow interpretation of venue 
would force the government to pinpoint the precise location of the aircraft 
                                                                                                                 
laws to defendants who commit crimes “in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United 
States”). 
 241. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. 49 U.S.C. § 46506. 
 246. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 74, § 1406. 
 247. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-958, at 1–4, 9–11 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2563, 2563–65, 2570–71). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.; see also United States v. Hall, 691 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1982) (“By contrast, 
[defendant] would have us construe § [46506] in a way that would require proof of precisely 
where his threats and assaults took place, in a plane traveling across many states at great 
speed, high above the earth. Such an interpretation would often make § [46506] difficult to 
enforce—precisely the opposite of Congress’s intention in passing it, and the related venue 
section.”). 
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to determine proper venue for the accompanying assault charge.
251
 Thus, 
the government may be forced to prosecute two crimes predicated on the 
same behavior, with the same witnesses, and the same evidence in two 
different districts. Taking this existing legislation together with the statutory 
scheme and legislative history, courts would best effectuate congressional 
intent by interpreting § 3237(a) to cover all sky crimes, including the one at 
issue in Lozoya. 
Conclusion 
Criminal venue on airplanes adds a new twist on a foundational principle 
of the American criminal justice system. Courts addressing the problem 
have tried to preserve a defendant’s constitutional right to be tried where a 
crime occurred without creating a loophole for otherwise guilty parties to 
escape legal consequences. These efforts, however, have created inflexible 
rules that make the administration of justice more difficult for defendants, 
victims, and prosecutors.  
While the universe of noncontinuous sky crimes may seem small, the 
potential implications are not. Though Lozoya involved a simple assault 
between two adults, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow, textual approach could 
have devastating implications for sexual assault cases involving 
unaccompanied minors. But the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s broad 
approach, which would empower prosecutors to bring the case in their 
preferred flyover district, would impermissibly infringe upon a defendant’s 
right to be tried where the crime occurred. This unchecked prosecutorial 
power directly implicates the fairness concerns the Sixth Amendment was 
designed to protect. 
This Comment has argued that courts faced with novel venue questions on 
airplanes should focus instead on the underlying policy concerns that 
prompted the Framers to enshrine venue protections in the Constitution over 
200 years ago. Under § 3237(a), judges should consider the specific facts and 
circumstances in each case to select a district that serves those policies—most 
likely the district in which either the arrival or departure airport is located. 
When judges employ this functional, flexible analysis, they can protect a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, ensure the operability of the criminal justice 
system in the skies, and close the Lozoya loophole for good. 
 
Allyson Shumaker 
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